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•Solidarity Enters the Fray
 
By David S. Mason 
T HE recent agreements be­tween the Polish government and the Solidarity-led opposi­
tion are path-breaking developments. 
They herald the dawning of democra­
cy and could portend the eventual 
disintegration of the Soviet bloc. But 
those goals are still distant. 
The first step may be the most diffi­
cult: holding open and competitive 
national legislative elections. For Soli­
darity, the elections pose an exciting 
opportunity to share in the govern­
ance of Poland, but they also confront 
the opposition with formidable chal­
lenges. The outcome ofthe elections is 
by no means certain. 
The April agreements included 
provisions on social policy, economic 
reform, and trade union pluralism 
(which legalizes Solidarity). Most im­
portant are the political reforms. The 
agreement calls for "radical reform of 
the state" and for "political pluralism," 
including the right to freely form po­
litical and social organizations. It also 
recognizes the right of a political op­
position to legal activity. 
An institutionalized role for the op­
position is provided in a restructured 
national legislature. The existing par­
liament, the Sejm, will be elected in 
June with 35 percent of the seats re­
served for "nonparty" candidates; that 
is, for people not belonging to the rul­
ing communist party or its coalition 
partners. A second legislative cham­
ber, the Senate, will be reconstituted, 
with freely contested elections for all 
I 00 seats. Candidates can be regis­
tered by collecting signatures from 
3,000 eligible voters in their districts. 
The new Senate will have the right to 
veto legislation passed by the Sejm. 
These arrangements make it possi­
ble for Solidarity to control one cham­
ber of the legislature and therefore to 
exercise a major voice in Poland's fu­
ture. But first Solidarity must win the 
elections - a task which, in spite of 
widespread popular disgust with the 
regime, may not be so easy. Seven 
years of political and economic stagna­
tion have turned most Poles away 
from politics altogether. 
Until the last few months, public 
opinion polls, both official and unoffi­
cial, have shown low levels of support 
for both the regime and the opposition. 
Lech Walesa's and Solidarity's popu­
larity skyrocketed to 79 percent and 
70 percent, respectively, during the 
round-table discussions, but it remains 
to be seen whether this level of sup­
port will continue. Compared with 
past years, even under martial law, 
there are few signs of support for the 
opposition in the streets of Warsaw. 
A related problem is the divisions 
within the opposition. 
Mr. Walesa has created a Citizens' 
Committee of about I 00 prominent 
opposition figures, which will take re­
sponsibility for managing the cam­
paign for the opposition. But this 
committee contains representatives of 
different constituencies: the "old" 
leadership of Solidarity from 1980-81 ; 
some of the more militant leaders of 
the strikes in 1988; representatives of 
other underground opposition 
groups, such as "Freedom and Peace"; 
academics; farmers; and the Roman 
Catholic intelligentsia. 
Walesa faces a major task in hold­
ing together these various constituen­
cies, at least until the elections. He ex­
pressed concern himself about this 
phenomenon on his recent visit to 
Rome: "Solidarity for the moment is 
huge, but it will become smaller with 
the growth of other organizations. 
This is the logical course of events." 
Given the relatively easy procedure 
for registering candidates, it is likely 
that there will be more than two candi­
dates for some of the "opposition" 
seats. This raises the possibility that a 
splintered opposition will divide its 
votes and allow the regime's candi­
dates to win. 
This eventuality is diminished 
somewhat by the two-step electoral 
procedure provided for in the agree­
ments. A candidate must win 50 per­
cent of the votes in the first round; 
otherwise the top two candidates face 
a runoff election in the second round. 
This is similar to the French electoral 
system: a compromise between the 
American "winner-take-all" system 
and the other extreme of proportional 
representation. It is not likely to help 
the regime's candidates win; on the 
other hand, it could lead to a 
multiplicity of groups (or even per­
haps parties) on the opposition side. 
Thus, the divisions in Polish society 
will be reflected in the legislature it­
self This will require bargaining and 
compromises within the opposition, as 
well as between the opposition and the 
regime. The word "compromise" has 
almost entirely negative connotations 
for most Poles; this is one reason so 
many were skeptical about the round­
table negotiations and agreements. 
For good or ill, however, compromise 
will be necessary for the new legisla­
tive arrangements to work. 
SOLIDARITY faces another challenge - from those who support the regime, or oppose 
Solidarity. The Western myth holds 
that everyone supports Solidarity. But 
that was not true even at the end of 
1981, when the bitter political battles, 
strikes, and economic collapse cut 
away at its popularity. Polls in the mid­
I 980s showed about a third of the 
population supported the opposition, 
a third supported the regime, and the 
rest constituted a Polish silent "major­
ity." The regime can expect support 
from its third, and will campaign for 
support from the silent third. There 
are many sentiments the party can 
tap: support for egalitarianism; for 
"law and order"; for evolutionary 
change. 
The agreements are cast as "the be­
ginning of the road to parliamentary 
democracy." But such a system is not 
easy to achieve; only about 20 coun­
tries worldwide have maintained such 
a system over a sustained period. Sol­
idarity and the Polish opposition will 
learn quickly how difficult the path 
will be. They may not "win" this June. 
But the contest is the beginning of the 
end of traditional communism. 
• David S. Mason is a visiting scholar at 
the Hoover Instiiution, StanJm-d Univel'­
sity, and author oj "Public Opinion and 
Political Change in Poland. " 
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